caveman caveman's cat

1. imo Occam's razor is abused

IMO nothing is wrong with Occam's razor statement in Quote 1, so I agree with it.

Quote 1:
“More things should not be used than are necessary”
William of Ockham, 14th century

Here is another way to say Quote 1 but in more mathy terms:

Quote 2:
“By definition, all assumptions introduce possibilities for error; if an assumption does not improve the accuracy of a theory, its only effect is to increase the probability that the overall theory is wrong.”

1.1. a case where Occam's razor is not abused

Before I show you how Occam's razor is abused, let me show you a case where it is not abused.

Suppose that we want to predict how far would a 100kg stone travel after being thrown by a catapult. Then, someone proposes function $$f : x_1,_2,\ldots,x_n \to [0, \infty]$$ where $x_1,x_2,\ldots,x_n$ are some input numbers that quantify things, such as stone's mass, stone's shape, length of the catapult's arm, amount of force that moves the arm, etc.

Suppose that $f$ is pretty accurate in predicting how far the stone would travel, with an error that follows the normal distribution $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

Nice, right? So now we can use the function $f$, feed it with input, and pretty accurately get where the projectile would land.

But now imagine some other dude found that the $n^{th}$ input of $f$ was not needed, so he came up with another function $$g : x_1,_2,\ldots,x_{n-1} \to [0, \infty]$$ that needs 1 less input (no need for $x_n$), and is also exactly as accurate with an error that follows the same normal distribution $N(\mu, \sigma^2)$.

As you see, the utility of $f$ is exactly identical to $g$'s, and hence the extra complexity of $f$ due to it needing $n$ many arguments (instead of $n-1$ as in $g$), is unnecessary complexity.

Hence, we can rightfully conclude that $g$ is a better model in explaining the phenomenon than $f$.

1.2. a case where Occam's razor is abused

What if I tell you that, while $f$ needs an extra argument that $g$ does not need:

In this case, $f$'s extra arguments is suddenly not unnecessary any more because the extra argument allows to increase the utility of $f$ in a scenario that we care about. Therefore, IMO using Occam's razor here to reject $f$ is wrong.

See, utility is important. If more things increase a thing's utility, then those more things are no longer unnecessary, and hence Occam's razor does not apply to them.

Utility depends on the domain/scenario. E.g. in the scenario of Section 1.1 $f$'s more things is unnecessary, and hence Occam's razor applies to eliminate $f$. But in this section's scenario $f$'s more things is not unnecessary and hence Occam's razor does not apply.

1.3. is believe in God unnecessary?

I agree that, say, physics' models probably don't need believe in God. E.g. if you give me an equation to model gravity that somehow incorporates believe in God into it, then most likely your model has a unnecessary complexity over the existing physics model for gravity, which lacks believe in God.

But does this mean that, in all scenarios, believe in God is an unnecessary addition? Simply because adding believe in God in some models, such as physic's models for gravity, is unnecessary, it does not mean that believe in God is unnecessary in virtually every other scenario.

E.g. $f$ is not virtually unnecessary in all scenarios. $f$ was only unnecessary in Section 1.1's scenario, but it was totally necessary in Section 1.2's scenario.

Therefore, if any person claims that “believe in God is unnecessary. Period!”, then that person must prove that there is virtually no scenario at all where believe in God has any utility.

I have never seen any person manage to back the claim that “there is no scenario where God is necessary”. Therefore, by the same sciencey stuff they claim they like, I hereby call their claims unsubstantiated.

1.4. proof that believe in God is necessary

Section 1.3 showed how the claim “believe in God is unnecessary” is actually unsubstantiated. In this section, I will take it further by showing you that it is actually false.

Theorem 1. Believe in God is necessary.

1.4.1. Theorem 1's proof

First let's define some basic tools1:

Definition 1. For a thing $a$ to be necessary, there must be a senario $s$ where $a$ has maximum utility over its alternative things.

Definition 2. For any scenario $s$, and for any pair of things $a$ and $b$, $a$'s utility is more than $b$'s in scenario $s$, if and only if $a$ achieves the goal of $s$ better than $b$.

Axiom 1. Our goal in reality/nature is to maximize what is good.

Definition 3. A thing is good if it maximizes our survivability. Click here for more info about this definition.

In order to prove Theorem 1, all we need to do is to show that there exists a scenario $s$ where believe in God has a higher utility than otherwise.

Below is a list of scenarios where believe in God results in a higher survivability of its followers (one is enough, but I show more):

On the other hand, I don't know any general statistics that show that believe in the Abrahamic God is harmful. You might be thinking of ISIS, or religious wars. But I have two points for you:

IMO it should be very clear that believe in the Abrahamic God increases our survivability. Then:

  1. By Definition 3 we can see that believe in the Abrahamic God is good.
  2. By Axiom 1 we can see that believe in the Abrahamic God allows us to meet our goal better
  3. By Definition 2 we can see that there is at least a scenario $s$ where believe in the Abrahamic God has more utility than otherwise.
  4. By Definition 1 we can see that believe in the Abrahamic God is necessary.


  • 1. IMO the tools are pretty fair and you shouldn't face much unease accepting them.

2. thoughts on majority voting

Majority voting —the backbone of democracy— has several flaws, but this is what really bothers me:

Conjecture 1. Ideally2, when the voters are any from the entire population, the majority of voters are non-experts on the subject that they are voting on.

I think it's obvious why Conjecture 1 is probably true by looking at the past. E.g. British ppl who voted on Brexit were mostly non-experts in economy nor politics. So I think Conjecture 1 is a fair conjecture.

Conjecture 1 is very bothering, because it says that the best thing you could get out of majority voting is some mediocre average shit.

2.1. what's its goal?

But if it's so bad, why do many govs use it? Are they simply dumb and they can't see what a caveman saw? I doubt. Are they smart, but there is another motive behind majority-voting? But if you have a peaceful population, then no need for majority voting IMO.

IMO Conjecture 2 shows the only reason majority voting is appealing. I.e. it's a good method for reducing riots, which can eventually save a lot of money if you have a badass population that may riot any time.

Conjecture 2. Majority voting guarantees that the majority of the population are happy about the decision.

2.2. how about other goals?

What if, instead of aiming to please most people (majority-voting's aim), our goal was to rather find the best decision? I don't think majority voting is it (due to Conjecture 1). What I think is it3, is the following method:

  1. Agree on the definition of what is good. I suggest this definition of good.
  2. Choose/perform the decision that has maximum expected good.
  3. If someone wishes to change something, that someone would need to present evidence that his change is more good than the existing something.

It doesn't matter if it's 1 person, or 1 billion people, who want the change. What matters is only to present evidence that shows that a change is more good.

But obviously, soon, we will end up seeing ppl abusing sources of evidence. E.g. if statistics is the source, then we will see ppl generating false statistics and claiming that they are legit, while they aren't.

2.3. what's happening in reality?

IMO, in reality, in nice democratic countries, this is what's happening:

  1. Majority voting is used to calm idiots so they don't riot in streets. They only elect a symbolic figure, like a president — Section 2.1.
  2. The real decisions are actually done by experts in their domains (e.g. game theorists, logicians, statisticians, etc) behind closed doors — Section 2.2.

In nice dictatorship countries, this is what's happening:

  1. The real decisions are actually done by experts in their domains (e.g. game theorists, logicians, statisticians, etc) behind closed doors — Section 2.2.

As you see, nice dictatorship is more efficient than nice democracy as the former doesn't need to waste resources to run the votes.

Which is of course not a surprise that a nice dictatorship is better than a nice democracy.

2.4. democracy vs. dictatorship

Which approach is more likely to produce a nice system: Democracy? Or dictatorship? IMO dictatorship, because:

Of course, democracy is also bound by natural selection, which is why I think it mostly got extinct in practice due to Conjecture 1.

2.5. will voting always work?

In Section 2.1 is said that majority voting is good to calm people, and hence save money that would be otherwise spent on riot control. In this section I ask the question: will it always work?

My answer: IMO no. My justification: at some point people will eventually learn that it's a fake play to calm the majority. At this point, it will no longer be effective, as people will know that their voice are actually uheard.

IMO, voting is either a bad idea (see Conjecture 1), or a lie to avoid riots. In the case of the former, it's getting extinct by natural selection. In the case of the latter, IMO it goes under lies don't sustain like any win-lose relationship.

  • 2. Assuming no strategic dishonest voting, or exploitations by foreign faggots.
  • 3. Assuming ideal scenario with no dishonest people.

3. Kant's categorical imperative is obsolete

I just wanna say that Kant's categorical imperative:

Rule 1. Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law.

is obsoleted by my superior alternative:

Rule 2. Do what is good for humanity.

Why? you may ask. Bcoz simpler and correcter. The simpler is maybe easy to see, but why correcter?

3.1. suicide case

Rule 2 is correcter than Rule 1 because former is much more objective than the latter. E.g. with Rule 1 a suicidal person may say “Welp… I'm OK to be killed by others, therefore it is also OK for me to kill others”. This problem does not exist in Rule 2.

But Kant knew of that suicide issue and proposed a solution. So he added a special case to handle the suicide. IMO he is basically adding the exception “let's also not get extinct!4 — my Rule 2 handles this issue cleanly without needing to add any special case!

3.2. fancy facility case

Here is another example beyond the suicide case earlier where my Rule 2 trumps Kant's Rule 1:

Under Kant's Rule 1, it will be immoral of me if I created that obviously good research facility! IMO this shows a limitation in Rule 1.

While my Rule 2 does not suffer from any of those exceptions. As you see, my shit is simpler and better than Kant's shit.

3.3. why didn't Kant see Rule 2?

Maybe in part because he was from the 1700s, while evolution came later IMO since Darwin is an 1800s dude. This matters because it relates to how I define good.

  • 4. I'm paraphrasing Kant's words in my own's.